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FOSKETT v McKEOWN[*] 
Hard-Nosed Property Rights or Unjust Enrichment? 
I INTRODUCTION 
The recent judgment of the House of Lords in Foskett[1] is extremely important as it 
straddles insurance law, property law, tracing and unjust enrichment. First, it establishes 
the proposition that it is possible to trace misappropriated moneys wrongfully paid as 
premiums into the proceeds of a policy. Second, two of the Law Lords contemplated the 
abolition of the distinction between the rules for tracing in law and tracing in equity. Third, 
the judgments of the Law Lords contain valuable guidance as to the context in which 
equitable ownership and the law of unjust enrichment should be viewed. 
II THE FACTS 
The salient facts of Foskett are as follows. The claimants were a group of purchasers who 
entered into contracts for the purchase of plots of land in Portugal. Moneys were paid to be 
held on trust by one Timothy Murphy until completion of the development. The land was 
never developed and the moneys were dissipated. 
On 6 November 1986, Timothy Murphy effected a whole life policy in the sum of £1 000 000 
at an annual premium of £10 220. Five premiums were paid in November 1986, 1987, 1988, 
1989 and 1990. The 1986 and 1987 premiums were paid by Timothy Murphy, whereas the 
1989 and 1990 premiums totalling £20 440 were paid out of moneys misappropriated by 
Timothy Murphy from the purchasers. (The source of the 1988 premium was disputed.) The 
named beneficiaries of the policy were his wife (a one-tenth share) and his three children (a 
nine-tenths share). 
On 9 March 1991, Timothy Murphy committed suicide. The insurers paid out a sum of £1 
000 580.04. The dispute was essentially one between the children of Murphy, as named 
beneficiaries of the policy, and the purchasers. The children contended that the purchasers 
were only entitled to a return of £20 440 without interest or nothing at all. The purchasers, 
on the other hand, alleged that they were entitled to 40 per cent of the proceeds of the 
policy. 
The policy had a notional investment content which served the following purposes: (a) to 
determine the surrender value of the policy; (b) to determine the alternative calculation of 
the death benefit if the value of the allocated units exceeded the sum assured of £1 000 000; 
and (c) to pay for the cost of life cover after the payment of the second premium in 
November 1987. If the third premium was not paid, the policy would be converted into a 
paid-up policy and the units that were allocated to the policy would be applied annually in 
meeting the cost of life insurance until all the allocated units had been used up. The policy 
would lapse thereafter. Due to the investment content of the policy, it was found that, even 
if the 1989 and 1990 premiums had not been paid, the proceeds payable to the children 
would have remained the same. This was essentially the children’s argument as to why the 
purchasers were not entitled to a pro rata payment of the policy proceeds. 
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The Court of Appeal’s decision in Foskett v McKeown[2] has been extensively noted.[3] In 
the Court of Appeal, Scott V-C and Hobhouse LJ (with Morritt LJ dissenting) held that the 
purchasers were entitled to repayment of the amount of the fourth and fifth premiums with 
interest, but were not entitled to a pro rata share of the policy proceeds. Essentially, Scott V-
C took the view that the purchasers’ claim was more analogous to a situation where 
misappropriated trust moneys were used to improve or maintain an asset rather than a 
situation where a beneficiary’s moneys were used to help purchase an asset.[4] In the 
circumstances, he held that the purchasers had at most a charge on the policy.[5]Hobhouse 
LJ, on the other hand, found that there was no causative link between the fourth and fifth 
premiums and the proceeds paid out under the policy.[6] 
III THE DECISION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
The House of Lords by a bare 3–2 majority[7] held that the purchasers were entitled to 
more than a return of the premium paid. The result was particularly close as Lord Browne-
Wilkinson confessed that at the close of the hearing he had wanted to hold for the children. 
However, he changed his mind after reading the draft speech of Lord Millett.[8] Even within 
the majority, the Law Lords disagreed on the manner in which the purchasers’ share should 
be calculated.[9] 
A Vindication of Property Rights or Unjust Enrichment? 
The majority of the House of Lords (Lord Browne-Wilkinson,[10] Lord Hoffmann[11] and 
Lord Millett[12]) stressed that it must be appreciated that this was a claim based on a 
vindication of the purchasers’ equitable interest and not a claim premised on unjust 
enrichment. In fact, Lord Hope also opined that the purchasers were seeking to vindicate 
their claim to their own money.[13] Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated: 
The rules establishing equitable proprietary interests and their enforceability against 
certain parties have been developed over the centuries and are an integral part of the 
property law of England. It is a fundamental error to think that, because certain property 
rights are equitable rather than legal, such rights are in some way discretionary. This case 
does not depend on whether it is fair, just and reasonable to give the purchasers an interest 
as a result of which the court in its discretion provides a remedy. It is a case of hard-nosed 
property rights.[14] 
Lord Millett was equally emphatic: 
The transmission of a claimant’s property rights from one asset to its traceable proceeds is 
part of our law of property, not of the law of unjust enrichment. There is no ‘unjust factor’ to 
justify restitution (unless ‘want of title’ be one, which makes the point). The claimant 
succeeds if at all by virtue of his own title, not to reverse unjust enrichment. Property rights 
are determined by fixed rules and settled principles. They are not discretionary. They do 
not depend upon ideas of what is ‘fair, just and reasonable.’ Such concepts, which in reality 
mask decisions of legal policy, have no place in the law of property.[15] 
The analysis of the majority of the House of Lords that the claim was a vindication of the 
purchasers’ property rights and not premised on the principle of unjust enrichment is 
significant as it affects the formal structure of the law of unjust enrichment. In particular, it 
impacts on the current debate on the circumstances where a restitutionary response is 
generated, or what are commonly known as the unjust factors. Burrows maintains that one 
unjust factor is the ‘retention of property belonging to the plaintiff without his 
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consent.’[16] This unjust factor overlaps with other unjust factors such as mistake or failure 
of consideration. However, according to Burrows, to avoid an overlap and to maintain 
conceptual purity, where such an unjust factor is operating any claim should be analysed as 
the sole autonomous unjust factor. 
Until recently, Burrows’ analysis had the extra-judicial support of Lord Millett: 
It is, therefore, my thesis that there are two situations, and two situations only, in which 
proprietary restitutionary remedies are available for subtractive unjust enrichment. The first 
is where the claimant can establish a continuing beneficial interest in the property to which 
he lays claim. Such a beneficial interest will almost invariably arise under a resulting 
trust.[17] 
Rather surprisingly, Lord Millett appears to have rescinded from this position in Foskett as 
demonstrated by the passage quoted above.[18] On balance, it is this author’s view that a 
proprietary analysis is preferable where the claimant retains the equitable title and is 
merely seeking to vindicate their equitable title. Grantham and Rickett forcefully argue that 
once a claimant is able to show that they continue to retain an equitable right in rem it 
follows that there must be a secondary obligation in personam to vindicate such 
rights.[19] There is simply no reason in such circumstances why a proprietary analysis 
should bow down in deference to an unjust enrichment analysis.[20] 
However, the words used by Lord Millett in the parentheses in the passage quoted 
above[21] may give rise to an argument that his position is equivocal at best. It can be 
argued that the passage above should be confined to the particular situation where the 
claim is a proprietary claim premised on the claimant’s equitable title. If such a restrictive 
reading of Foskett is adopted, then perhaps Burrows’ categorisation of ‘retention of 
property belonging to the plaintiff without his consent’ as an unjust factor may still be 
salvaged where the claimant is not pursuing a proprietary claim but a personal one.[22] 
The distinction between a proprietary analysis and an analysis premised upon unjust 
enrichment at first blush appears to be mere academic hair-splitting, but it is not. It has two 
important practical consequences: (a) the elements of an equitable proprietary claim and a 
claim in unjust enrichment are different; and (b) different defences may apply. Lord Millett 
held that, in a claim for a vindication of an equitable interest, the claimant only needs to 
show that the defendant was in receipt of property which belonged beneficially to the 
claimant or of its traceable proceeds. The claimant need not show that the receipt had 
enriched the defendant.[23] Thus, the children’s argument that the purchasers should only 
be entitled to the premiums paid because the 1989 and 1990 premiums did not cause an 
increase in the proceeds payable to the children was misconceived. Further, Lord Millett 
opined that a claim in unjust enrichment was subject to a change of position defence. An 
action such as the present one was subject to a ‘bona fide purchaser for value defence’.[24] 
It is also not entirely clear whether Lord Millett rejected the analysis that all proprietary 
rights contingent on a tracing exercise are subject to a change of position defence.[25] This 
is because, on the facts, there was no conceivable change of position by the children and 
thus the House of Lords did not have to grapple with this issue. Further, Lord Millett only 
said that different defences ‘may’ apply.[26] One view is to argue that the claimants had an 
immediate and automatic vested proprietary right in the traceable proceeds of the original 
property subject to the requirement of election.[27] It may also be argued that, since the 
change of position defence does not apply to a claim for the original property, the defence is 
equally inapplicable to a claim for the traceable proceeds of the original property. However, 
there is a conceptual difficulty with such an analysis because of the problem of identifying 
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the process whereby the traceable proceeds vest in the claimant’s name. Birks argues that 
what a claimant has in these circumstances is merely a suspensory right or a power in rem 
to ask the court to vest the property in their name.[28] This power acts prospectively and 
not retroactively. On this analysis, the question would be whether this power in rem should 
be subject to a change of position defence. Ultimately, this issue is a question of policy, that 
is, how strong should proprietary rights be? In other words, in the context of this case, 
should a claimant’s equitable interest take precedence over a defendant’s security of 
receipt? It would appear that Lord Millett was in favour of stronger proprietary rights and 
was not inclined to consider the policy of ensuring a defendant’s security of receipt as a 
justification for defeating such property rights. He took the view that legal policy had no 
place in the law of property.[29] 
Next, Birks’ famous cause and response analysis appears to be incompatible with the House 
of Lords’ decision. According to Birks, all rights which an individual holds, whether in 
personam or in rem, derive from the following causative factors: (a) wrongs; (b) consent; 
(c) unjust enrichment; and (d) others.[30] Birks characterises an equitable interest as inert 
and argues that equity’s vindicatio is given teeth by the recognition of a subsidiary 
obligation to restore the res. Thus, according to Birks, in an action in equity for a vindication 
of an equitable interest, the causative factor is among the category known as 
‘others’.[31] However, the House of Lords’ decision suggests that a neat and clean 
delineation between a cause and response analysis may not always be possible. An 
equitable proprietary interest may be both a cause and a response.[32] While it is agreed 
that in certain circumstances a proprietary interest is usually a response,[33]Foskett proves 
that a pre-existing equitable proprietary interest may also be a causative factor. The 
confusion in Foskett as to whether this was a vindication of an equitable proprietary 
interest or a claim in unjust enrichment shows that perhaps it is not so prudent to 
characterise such a claim in a category known as ‘others’, as it hides the fact that a pre-
existing equitable interest may also be a causative factor. 
B Premiums Paid — Mixed Funds or Mere Improvement to a  
Pre-Existing Property? 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett rejected the analogy that the moneys paid as the 
fourth and fifth premiums of an insurance policy should be viewed as an improvement to a 
pre-existing property. Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with Lord Millett that the analogy 
with moneys mixed in an account is more accurate.[34] They reasoned that, where a trustee 
mixed moneys in a bank account, there were no actual physical moneys in the account. 
Before the mixture, the trustee had a chose in action against the bank to demand payment 
of the credit balance on their account. After the mixture, the trustee had the same chose in 
action but the value of the chose in action would include the moneys wrongly paid in. 
Applying this analogy to the present case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that, when the 
purchasers’ moneys were wrongfully paid as premiums, the purchasers had a proprietary 
right to share rateably in the proceeds of the policy as reflected in their contribution.[35] 
With regard to the argument that the purchasers were unable to show a causative link 
between the fourth and fifth premiums and the proceeds payable, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
held that the beneficial ownership of the policy did not depend upon how the events turned 
out. He stated that ‘[t]he rights of the parties in the policy, one way or another, were fixed 
when the relevant premiums were paid when the future was unknown.’[36] Lord Millett 
held that the causative link argument was fallacious as it was derived from the language of 
the law of unjust enrichment. He also found that the relevant question was whether the 
death benefit was attributable to all the premiums or only to some of them. The answer 
would be that the death benefit was attributable to all the premiums because the policy 
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represented the product of all the premiums.[37] Lord Millett held that the argument that 
the fourth and fifth premiums did not contribute to the amount payable under the 
insurance would lead to a capricious result as it would be dependent on the order of the 
payments made. He found that this approach was unacceptable, as it would mean that the 
ownership of the policy could not be determined until the policy matured or was 
realised.[38] According to Lord Millett, ‘[t]he ownership of the policy must be ascertainable 
at every moment from inception to maturity; it cannot be made to await events.’[39] 
Lord Millett unequivocally rejected the suggestion that the case of Re Hallett’s Estate; 
Knatchbull v Hallett[40] was authority for the proposition that in a situation where a new 
asset is acquired by the trustee partly with their own money and partly with trust money 
the beneficiary was confined to a lien. He held that the basic rule was that where the trustee 
in breach of trust used trust moneys to make part payment in acquiring an asset the 
beneficiary was ‘entitled at his option either to claim a proportionate share of the asset or to 
enforce a lien upon it to secure his personal claim against the trustee for the amount of the 
misapplied money.’[41] The basic rule was applicable to volunteers like Timothy Murphy’s 
children in this case. However, this rule was only applicable against the wrongdoer and 
those deriving title under the wrongdoer otherwise than for value. It was not available 
against other contributors who were innocent of any wrongdoing, whose funds were mixed 
with the beneficiary’s moneys. Where there were other contributors and the mixed fund 
was deficient, the beneficiary would not be entitled to enforce a lien for their contribution 
and all the contributors would share rateably in the mixed fund.[42] 
Lord Millett further held that it did not matter whether the trust money was mixed in a 
single fund before being used to acquire the asset or separate payments (whether 
simultaneously or sequentially) were made out of differently owned funds to acquire the 
asset. It was therefore unnecessary for the claimant to show that their property had 
contributed to any increase in the value of the new asset. This is because, in a claim to 
vindicate a proprietary interest, proof of enrichment is unnecessary.[43] 
On the other hand, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, who were in the minority, considered that 
the situation was analogous to a situation where the moneys were used to improve a pre-
existing property.[44] They agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal that where a 
trustee used trust moneys to improve or maintain their house the beneficiaries were only 
entitled to a charge on the house to recover their money. The beneficiaries were entitled to 
a pro rata share in the house only if the improvements had increased the value of the house. 
On the facts, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope found that there was no causative link between the 
fourth and fifth premiums and the proceeds paid out.[45] Lord Hope held that in this case 
the policy had been paid out and the reason why it was paid out could be 
determined.[46] In the circumstances, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope were of the opinion that 
the purchasers were not entitled to a pro rata share of the policy. 
This point again seems to turn on whether the purchasers had an immediate and automatic 
vested interest in the traceable proceeds of the insurance policy or whether they merely 
had a suspensory interest in the insurance policy, that is, a power in rem. The majority of 
the House of Lords seems to have taken the position that the purchasers’ rights crystallised 
at the time the premium was paid and they consequently had an immediate vested interest 
in the policy.[47]However, the minority appears to have taken the view that the court was 
entitled to look at the transactions in totality ex post facto and that the purchasers’ rights 
were suspensory in the meantime. This issue is really a question of policy as to how far the 
court would go to protect a claimant’s equitable interest as weighed against the defendant’s 
security of receipt. Evidently, the majority in the House of Lords felt that the latter was 
subservient to the former. 
  
SMU Classification: Restricted 
C Windfall Argument 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett also rejected the argument that the purchasers 
would enjoy a ‘windfall’ on the facts of the case. In response to this argument, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson pointed out that a so-called windfall is a necessary incident to property 
rights.[48] Lord Millett, on the other hand, rejected the unspoken assumption that the 
assured had provided a form of contribution by dying earlier. Lord Millett pointed out that 
the death of the assured merely determined when the assured sum was to be paid and did 
not affect the question of ownership.[49] 
D Is the Same Principle Applicable to Indemnity Insurance? 
It must be noted that Foskett was concerned with a life policy, that is, a non-indemnity 
insurance. The proceeds of the life insurance are not a valuation of or substitute for the life 
of the assured. However, it is not clear whether the same principle would apply to 
indemnity insurance. Dr Lionel Smith argues that in an indemnity insurance, where an asset 
is insured and destroyed, the proceeds of the insurance policy are determined not merely 
by the premiums paid but also by the diminution of the value of the asset.[50] Thus, if the 
asset that was destroyed belonged to the defendant, Foskett does not preclude the 
argument that where an indemnity insurance is concerned the diminution of the value of 
the asset should be taken into account when assessing the claimant’s share in the proceeds 
of the policy. 
E Moral Claims, Wrongdoing, Fairness, Justice and Equity 
Lord Steyn considered the relative moral claims of the purchasers and the children relevant. 
Lord Steyn held that the children were unaware of any wrongdoing of their father and that 
the children could say that, if they had become aware that their father had planned to use 
trust money to pay the fourth and fifth premiums, they would have insisted that he did not 
do so.[51] Lord Steyn and Lord Hope held that it would be artificial to argue that all five 
premiums produced the proceeds of the policy. The stolen moneys were also not causally 
relevant to any benefit received by the children. As such, Lord Steyn was of the view that 
the proprietary claim of the purchasers was not underpinned by any considerations of 
fairness or justice. Therefore, there was no justification for creating, by analogy with cases 
on equitable interests in mixed funds, a new proprietary right to the policy moneys in the 
circumstances of this case.[52] 
Lord Hope also considered the question whether it was equitable that the purchasers 
should recover a pro rata share. He held that the equities of the parties, their conduct and 
the consequences of allowing or rejecting the purchasers’ claim must be analysed and 
weighed up. In the end, the judgment had to consider what was fair, just and reasonable. He 
held that, since the purchasers were unable to demonstrate that the value of the moneys 
paid was causal to the proceeds paid out, the equities lay with the children and not with the 
purchasers.[53] 
The references to moral claims, wrongdoing, fairness, justice and equity by Lord Steyn and 
Lord Hope are regrettable. With respect, it is this author’s view that ultimately these 
references contributed nothing to their analysis and were unnecessary. The issue was 
whether the events in the present case should properly be viewed as a mere improvement 
to a pre-existing property as opposed to a mixing of moneys. Further, as Dr Smith 
perceptively points out, the defendants were the children of the wrongdoer. Furthermore, 
the children were volunteers in this action who had not contributed to the policy.[54] If 
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Lord Steyn’s and Lord Hope’s views are taken, then it would invite ‘commission of the 
wrong by assuring the wrong-doer that there is one mode in which he could surely profit by 
his turpitude, in securing a provision for his family.’[55] 
F Tracing — A Unitary System? 
The law of tracing is plagued by a perceived difference between common law tracing and 
tracing in equity. It is often said that the common law was only capable of tracing property 
when a clean substitution of property was involved and could not trace through a mixed 
fund.[56] Equity, on the other hand, had no such difficulty in tracing into mixed funds. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressly refrained from entering into this thorny discussion as to 
whether the different legal and equitable rules of tracing were justifiable.[57] 
On the other hand, Lord Steyn had no such reluctance. Lord Steyn accepted that tracing is a 
process of identifying assets and that it properly belongs to the realm of evidence. He 
accepted Birks’ analysis[58] that, since tracing belonged to the realm of evidence, the 
process of identification ceased to be either legal or equitable and there should be a unified 
regime for tracing.[59] 
Lord Millett also boldly wiped away the distinction between tracing in common law and 
equity. He defined tracing as follows: 
Tracing is thus neither a claim nor a remedy. It is merely the process by which a claimant 
demonstrates what has happened to his property, identifies its proceeds and the persons 
who have handled or received them, and justifies his claim that the proceeds can properly 
be regarded as representing his property.[60] 
He went on to hold: ‘Given its nature, there is nothing inherently legal or equitable about 
the tracing exercise. There is thus no sense in maintaining different rules for tracing at law 
and in equity.’[61] 
Thus, at least two of the Law Lords in this case were of the view that the same rules should 
apply to tracing in law and tracing in equity. This is heartening to note because as late as 
1996 Millett LJ in the Court of Appeal, in Trustee of the Property of F C Jones & Sons (a Firm) 
v Jones, had said that the fact that there were different tracing rules at law and in equity was 
‘unfortunate though probably inevitable’.[62] 
IV CONCLUSION 
Foskett raises many interesting issues. However, it is unfortunate that some of these issues 
remain unresolved. First, is there finally a unitary rule of tracing? Two of the Law Lords 
seem to think so, whereas the others remain ambivalent on this issue. On a strict reading of 
the judgments, it would be impossible to say that the House of Lords has held unequivocally 
that there is a unitary rule of tracing. The pronouncements by Lord Steyn and Lord Millett 
are at most obiter dicta. Second, is the defence of change of position inapplicable to a claim 
where the claimant is vindicating their equitable interest in the traceable proceeds? It 
would appear from Lord Millett’s judgment that this is so although he did not consider the 
conceptual difficulty of when the property vests in the traceable proceeds. Third, it is also 
not entirely clear whether the principles laid down by the majority apply equally where 
premiums are paid to service indemnity insurance as opposed to non-indemnity insurance 
— in other words, whether the diminution in value of the defendant’s insured asset can be 
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taken into account when assessing the claimant’s share in the insurance proceeds. Finally, it 
remains to be seen whether Foskett has the effect of abolishing ‘want of title’ or ‘retention of 
property belonging to the plaintiff without his consent’ as an unjust factor that generates a 
restitutionary response where the claim is a personal one. However, quite apart from the 
unresolved issues set out above, Foskett is a valuable decision as it clarifies the relationship 
between equitable ownership and the law of unjust enrichment. 
TANG HANG WU[*] 
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